Blog · November 13, 2026

Microsoft 365 went down again. Official reviews, and a vault outside that cloud

If you run a business, or you keep the lights on in IT, this week was familiar in the worst way. Mail stopped. Some admin pages would not load. Calendar features that depend on Exchange failed. You could not reach the very tools you use to tell everyone what was happening.

Microsoft’s own service health updates, under incident MO1550821, said users may be unable to connect to multiple Microsoft 365 services. The incident start time recorded in those updates is 18:26 UTC on 12 November 2026. In a later update, at 17:57 UTC on 13 November 2026, Microsoft apologized, said it was seeing broad recovery and stability, and described the event as a technical issue. It said it had addressed an issue introduced during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced after a recent network change, and that it was still restoring service to remaining customers and regions. It also said a full post-incident report would follow once its review was complete. As of that update, the recorded status was still service degradation, and a formal root-cause field had not yet been published. Those messages are Microsoft’s own, as collected in a public extract of Microsoft 365 admin-center incident reports.

This piece is not a claim that Microsoft is careless, and it is not a replacement guide for Exchange or Teams. It is a sourced look at what official reviews have already said about recent Microsoft outages, about a serious identity incident the U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board examined in 2024, about how the Internet Computer is built, and about what Qerron actually does for a business that wants a vault for important logins outside that same cloud.

What official reviews already said about earlier outages.

A completed picture is easier to read in Microsoft’s published Post Incident Reviews than in an event that is still being restored. On 29–30 October 2025, Microsoft’s PIR for tracking ID YKYN-BWZ describes a global Azure Front Door and Azure CDN incident. Between 15:41 UTC on 29 October and 00:05 UTC on 30 October 2025, customers and Microsoft services that rely on those edge platforms saw connection timeouts and DNS resolution issues. Recovery began to be visible from 18:30 UTC on 29 October, with full stabilization at 00:05 UTC the next day.

Microsoft’s stated cause was not an attack. A specific sequence of customer configuration changes, which Microsoft says were valid and non-malicious, was performed across two different control-plane build versions and produced incompatible configuration metadata. That metadata exposed a latent bug in the data plane. The crash happened asynchronously, so health checks still looked healthy while the bad configuration propagated globally — and the “last known good” snapshot was updated with it. Among the services Microsoft listed as affected were the Azure Portal, parts of Microsoft Entra ID, and Microsoft 365 (Microsoft pointed readers to incident MO1181369). In that review, Microsoft also noted that some customers could not open support cases in the Azure Portal or by phone.

A later PIR, tracking ID FNJ8-VQZ, covers 2–3 February 2026. Microsoft says that between 18:03 UTC on 2 February and about 00:30 UTC on 3 February, a platform issue caused control-plane failures and degraded performance for virtual machines and dependent services across multiple regions. The stated cause was a remediation workflow, meant to disable anonymous access on Microsoft-managed storage accounts, that was incorrectly applied — because of a data-synchronization problem in its targeting logic — to storage accounts that VM extension packages actually need to read. As those accounts were restored, a surge of retries overloaded managed identities in East US and West US, with that secondary impact lasting until 06:05 UTC on 3 February. Microsoft wrote that there was nothing customers could have done to avoid that specific incident.

Read together, the official stories are about concentration. A configuration, a workflow, or a network change in one provider’s platform can reach many products at once, including the admin path you would use to respond.

A different official review: identity, not uptime.

Outages and intrusions are not the same event. They do, however, land on the same fact: a great deal of business mail and sign-in now sits behind one company’s infrastructure and one company’s identity system.

In May and June 2023, a threat actor Microsoft calls Storm-0558 used forged authentication tokens to read Exchange Online mail. Microsoft’s 14 July 2023 analysis said the campaign began on 15 May 2023 and reached email at approximately 25 organizations, including government agencies, as well as related consumer accounts. The Cyber Safety Review Board’s report, dated 20 March 2024, citing Microsoft, describes access to the mailboxes of 22 enterprise organizations and 503 related personal accounts worldwide — at least 391 of those personal accounts in the United States — including senior U.S. government officials named in the Board’s executive summary.

The Board found that the intrusion was preventable and “should never have occurred.” It described “a cascade of security failures at Microsoft.” The technical core, as both Microsoft and the Board describe it, was a Microsoft account (MSA) consumer signing key from 2016, used to forge tokens, together with a flaw in token validation that let a consumer key be accepted for enterprise Exchange Online. The Board wrote that signing keys are “the cryptographic equivalent of crown jewels for any cloud service provider,” and that, combined with the validation flaw, the stolen key “permitted Storm-0558 to gain full access to essentially any Exchange Online account anywhere in the world.”

Microsoft has published its own investigation. In September 2023, and in a 12 March 2024 update to that post, Microsoft said its leading hypothesis was that operational errors allowed key material to leave the secure token signing environment and that a compromised engineering account later had access to a debugging environment. The March update also corrected earlier detail: Microsoft said it had not found a crash dump containing the impacted key material. The Board noted Microsoft’s full cooperation, and also criticized delays in correcting public statements. Those are the Board’s findings, offered here as they were written, not as a charge we are adding.

For a business, the practical lesson is narrower than blame. Mail, admin portals, and the keys that attest identity can fail, or be abused, in ways you do not control. It is reasonable to keep a separate, smaller set of critical logins and recovery details somewhere that is not the same provider’s cloud, with a clear rule for who can open them if you cannot.

How the Internet Computer is built, in brief.

Qerron runs on the Internet Computer, not on Microsoft Azure or Microsoft 365. Official developer documentation at internetcomputer.org describes the network this way.

The network is made of subnets: groups of nodes that each run their own instance of the ICP consensus protocol, maintain their own blockchain, and execute programs called canisters. When a canister is deployed, it is replicated across every node in its subnet. Official docs state that a single node cannot unilaterally change a canister’s state. Nodes are operated by independent node providers, voted into the network by the Network Nervous System, with membership designed to be diverse across operators, geographies, and jurisdictions — a process the docs call deterministic decentralization.

Each subnet’s consensus protocol produces a finalized block about every second and offers cryptographic finality: once an update call returns, the state change is committed. Chain-key cryptography gives each subnet a public key whose private key is not held by any one node. The key is split into shares with threshold cryptography, and nodes sign collectively without reconstructing the full key.

That is a different trust model from one company’s control plane and one company’s edge fleet. It is not a claim that the Internet Computer cannot have incidents, and it is not a claim that a product built on it is unhackable. It is a claim about where Qerron runs, and about what a single operator is not able to do alone under that protocol.

What Qerron actually does for a business.

Qerron is a passkey vault. You sign in with a passkey — Face, fingerprint, or a security key — not a master password. Items are encrypted on your device with vetKeys threshold encryption before they are stored. We cannot read them, and no single server can either.

For a shop or a small team, that means you can put supplier logins, recovery codes, and the notes that should not live in a mail thread into a vault, and share that vault with a one-time invite link. Each person signs in with their own passkey. You choose whether they can view, edit, or also share, and you can remove access later. Household is $72 a year for up to six people, each with a private vault, plus shared vaults. Personal is $48 a year and also includes sharing.

You can also set a named-person check-in so someone you trust can be given access to the vaults you picked if you stop checking in and the wait you set has passed. If you check in late, access is taken back. Qerron is a secure storage and access tool. It is not a will, not legal advice, and not a custodian of your assets. It will not keep Outlook online. It will hold the logins and instructions you chose to store, on a network that is not Microsoft’s, including when Microsoft 365 is having a bad day.

You can try the full product for fourteen days, with no credit card required. For a more technical reading of the same events, see how the Internet Computer is built. For a plainer family-facing version, see when Outlook goes down. An earlier, shorter note is in When Microsoft goes down, half the internet goes with it.

Sources

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