This week made a familiar problem visible twice. On 12 November 2026, Microsoft 365 services including Outlook went down after what the company later described as a technical issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade. Microsoft said it had no evidence of malicious activity and reported that service had been restored by 14 November. The next day, the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop after communications problems at air traffic control centers. The stop was lifted at 8:15 p.m. Eastern. Officials said there was no evidence of an attack; Reuters reported nearly 10,000 flights canceled by late Friday.
Those events are not a breach. In 2026, CISA and the FBI published, and later updated, a joint advisory on Iranian-affiliated actors targeting internet-connected industrial control devices. CISA also continues to recommend phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication — passkeys and other FIDO2/WebAuthn credentials — because a stolen password is still a standard way in. This is not a claim the protocol would have kept Outlook online or planes departing. It is a sourced walk through what the platform can sign, certify, and encrypt — and what it does not guarantee.
Canisters, persistence, and who pays for compute.
A canister is an isolated WebAssembly program. Official documentation says canisters cannot read or write one another’s state and communicate only through explicit asynchronous messages. Motoko’s orthogonal persistence means a persistent actor keeps its state across upgrades without a manual serialization hook. That convenience is also a reason not to leave raw secrets in canister memory. Official security guidance is explicit: on standard application subnets, node operators can read canister memory. SEV-SNP hardware memory encryption is being rolled out; until that is complete, the docs say not to store private keys, API tokens, or passwords in canister state.
Computation is paid in cycles by the canister, not by the end user — the arrangement often called a reverse-gas model. The operator still has to watch cycle balances, because anyone can send update calls, and even rejected calls consume cycles.
Subnets, chain-key signatures, and the query gap.
Each subnet runs the protocol as a replicated state machine: peer-to-peer, consensus, message routing, and deterministic execution. An update call is executed by every replica on the subnet. Official docs state that on a standard 13-node application subnet this tolerates up to four faulty nodes, that a single malicious node cannot alter the outcome, and that finality is cryptographic: once an update returns, the state change is committed.
That guarantee does not extend to a plain query. Queries are answered by a single replica and are faster, but the responding replica — or a boundary node in front of it — can return a fabricated result. Official docs treat this as the most important security boundary on the network: data from an uncertified query should be treated as unverified.
Chain-key cryptography is how the subnet signs without giving any one node the private key. The key is split into shares. Nodes produce threshold BLS signatures without reconstructing the key, and a client verifies a response against one public key. In February 2026, DFINITY reported roughly a tenfold increase in sustained threshold-signing throughput on signing-optimized subnets, a performance note rather than a change to the trust model.
What an HTTP gateway can actually check.
During an update, a canister that serves HTTP inserts a path, headers, and a body hash into a Merkle tree and commits the root with certified_data_set. The subnet signs that root as part of certified state. A later HTTP query returns IC-Certificate and IC-CertificateExpression headers. A verifying HTTP gateway — on a hostname such as .icp.net — checks the subnet’s BLS signature and the Merkle witness before it forwards the page. The raw hostname, .raw.icp.net, forwards the same response without checking it.
That is tamper-evident delivery of certified content: a forged page should fail verification at an honest verifying gateway, not a claim that every gateway is honest or that hosting on the network makes an application safe. Official docs warn against calling fetchRootKey() on mainnet; use the hardcoded Internet Computer root key.
Passkeys, then keys the canister never sees.
Internet Identity signs users in with WebAuthn passkeys. The credential is bound to the origin, which makes it much harder to phish than a typed password. It does not remove account-recovery or device-loss problems. In 2026 the identity product moved to a new experience at id.ai, and a September release added the ability to track app sessions and sign a device out remotely.
To encrypt data a user can later open from another device, official guidance points to vetKeys: verifiably encrypted threshold key derivation. A key is derived from the canister id, a developer-chosen context, and an input such as a principal or document id. The same triple always produces the same key. A canister calls vetkd_derive_key with the client’s ephemeral transport public key. A threshold of subnet nodes derives the key and encrypts it to that transport key. The canister forwards the ciphertext and never sees the raw vetKey. The client decrypts locally.
vetkd_derive_key : (record {
input : blob;
context : blob;
transport_public_key : blob;
key_id : record { curve : vetkd_curve; name : text };
}) -> (record { encrypted_key : blob });
The current API supports the curve bls12_381_g2; production uses the mainnet key key_1. This design makes it much harder for a single node, or the application operator, to read stored ciphertext. Official docs still leave access control, canister bugs, controller risk, unverified builds, and cycle-drain attacks to the developer.
Where Qerron fits.
Qerron is a passkey vault on the Internet Computer. It uses Internet Identity and vetKeys so items are encrypted in a way the company cannot read. It is not a will, not legal advice, and not a custodian. You can try it for fourteen days, with no credit card required. Personal is $48 a year. Household is $72 a year. For the lock in more detail, see the cryptography behind Qerron. For a plainer overview of the network, see What the Internet Computer Protocol is. For official reviews of the Microsoft incident, see After Microsoft’s latest outage: how the Internet Computer is built.
Sources
- CNBC, Microsoft apologizes for massive outage that took down Outlook and other 365 services
- Federal Aviation Administration, Statement on Nationwide Ground Stop
- Reuters, US to resume flights after air traffic network failure sparks chaos
- CISA, AA26-097A: Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure
- CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA
- ICP developer documentation, Security model, Protocol stack, Chain-key cryptography, Cycles, VetKeys, Response certification, and orthogonal persistence
- DFINITY Developer Forum, Chain-key Signing Performance Improvements (25 February 2026) and Internet Identity 2.0 at id.ai
- Internet Identity, release-2026-09-11 (revocable app sessions)
Try it free for 14 days, no credit card needed.