Encryption sounds like a wall of jargon. The idea is simpler than the words. You take something readable — a password, a note, a card number — and you turn it into ciphertext: a scramble that is useless on its own. To turn it back, you need the right key. Anyone who has only the scramble, and not the key, cannot read the original.
That is the whole point of a vault you do not want a company to look inside. Qerron stores the scramble. The key is not something we keep in a drawer on our side of the wall.
A lock, a key, and a box you can leave in public.
Imagine a box that snaps shut with a lock only your key can open. You can put that box in a building you do not own. The people who run the building can see that a box is there — in Qerron, that includes facts such as the names of your vaults, how many items are in them, and who a vault is shared with. They cannot open the box, and they cannot read the items. If someone copies the box, they still cannot open it. What matters is who holds the key.
In software, the “box” is encrypted data. The “building” is wherever that data is stored. In Qerron, items are encrypted on your device before they are stored. We cannot read them. Official Internet Computer documentation describes the method we use, called vetKeys: keys are derived so that no single machine, and no operator of the app, is supposed to see the raw key.
Two mistakes are easy to make here. The first is thinking “encrypted” means “nothing can ever go wrong.” It does not. A key can still be used by someone you invited. A device can be lost. Encryption is a strong lock, not a promise that a product is unhackable. The second is thinking the company must be able to reset the lock if you forget it. In Qerron there is no master password to reset. You sign in with a passkey. If every passkey and recovery method is gone, we cannot open the vault for you, because we cannot read it. That is the trade that keeps it private.
Why “threshold” matters, in one sentence.
Some systems keep one copy of a key on one server. If that server is copied, the key can go with it. A threshold system splits the work of making a key across many machines, so no single machine can produce the key on its own. That is the idea behind vetKeys threshold encryption, as the Internet Computer’s own documentation describes it: a group of nodes has to cooperate, and the derived key is delivered encrypted for the client, not in the clear to the server.
You do not have to manage those pieces yourself. When you save a login or a note in Qerron, encryption happens on your device, and the canister stores ciphertext. When you open the item, your signed-in session can obtain what it needs to decrypt it locally. There is a longer, more technical account in the cryptography behind Qerron.
What this means for a person using the vault.
It means we are not a custodian of the words inside your items. It means a shared vault can be opened by someone you invited, with their own passkey, without us reading the items in the middle. It means a named-person check-in can later give that person view access to what you chose, still without us being able to peek. And it means you should export your data if you want a copy you control, and register more than one way to sign in, the way you would keep a spare key.
Qerron is a passkey vault. You can try the full product for fourteen days, with no credit card required. Personal is $48 a year. Household is $72 a year. For a plain account of the network this vault runs on, see what the Internet Computer Protocol is.
Sources
- ICP developer documentation, VetKeys — verifiably encrypted threshold key derivation, and the EncryptedMaps pattern for encrypted storage
- ICP developer documentation, Chain-key cryptography — the threshold foundation vetKeys build on
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