This is a description of the cryptography Qerron actually uses, as it appears in the running product and in official Internet Computer documentation. It is not a tour of every technique the Internet Computer supports. If a capability is not in the vault — for example, signing transactions on other chains — it is not claimed here.
Passkeys, through Internet Identity.
You do not invent a master password for Qerron. Sign-in goes through Internet Identity, the Internet Computer’s sign-in service, at id.ai. Official documentation describes Internet Identity as authenticating with a passkey: a WebAuthn credential on your device, such as Face, a fingerprint, or a security key. Qerron opens that flow with the AuthClient used for Internet Identity, and the first time you sign in, that creates your account.
WebAuthn is the web standard for this kind of credential. A passkey is a key pair bound to a site, not a string you type into a form. The site stores a public key; the private part stays with your device or with the password manager your operating system already provides. That is why a lookalike page does not get a reusable secret to steal. A fuller comparison is in passkey vs password.
Internet Identity also derives a different principal for each application origin, so the same person is not automatically the same user across unrelated apps. Qerron pins its production sign-in to a single derivation origin so that qerron.com and the canister address open the same vault. We do not keep a password database of ours to leak. A passkey can still be lost with a device; official Internet Identity guidance is to add more than one device or recovery method ahead of time. We cannot restore a vault if every sign-in method is gone, because we cannot read or reset it.
vetKeys threshold encryption, and EncryptedMaps.
Vault items — logins, notes, cards, and address or ID entries — are encrypted in the browser before they are stored. The product uses the Internet Computer’s vetKeys system, through the EncryptedMaps library that official vetKeys documentation names as a ready-made pattern for this kind of encrypted storage.
Official docs describe vetKD, the protocol underneath, as verifiably encrypted threshold key derivation. In short:
- Threshold. Deriving a key requires a quorum of subnet nodes. No single node can derive it on its own.
- Encrypted. The derived key is encrypted under a transport key the client supplies, so no node and no canister is supposed to see the raw derived key.
- Verifiable. The recipient can check that the key they received is the correct one.
A key is derived from the canister, a developer-chosen context (a domain separator), and an application input. Qerron’s canister uses the production vetKD key named key_1, on the bls12_381_g2 curve that the management API supports, and the domain separator qerron_vault_v1, which isolates this app’s derived keys from other vetKeys deployments. Those values have to stay stable for the life of the data: changing them would make already-encrypted items unreadable, and the canister only ever sees ciphertext, so it cannot re-encrypt them.
When you save an item, the client encrypts the payload and sends ciphertext to the canister. When you open it, the client decrypts locally. Access to a vault — including sharing and a later heir release — is an access-control decision on who may obtain what they need to decrypt. We cannot read the items, and no single server can either.
Chain-key cryptography, as the foundation — not as extra product features.
Official vetKeys documentation points to chain-key cryptography as the threshold foundation vetKeys build on. On the Internet Computer, chain-key cryptography is also how a subnet holds a public key whose private key is split across nodes, so nodes can sign collectively without reconstructing the full key. That is part of how the network certifies responses and agrees on state. It is described in more depth in what the Internet Computer Protocol is and in how the Internet Computer is built.
Qerron does not, in this product, use chain-key signatures to control accounts on other blockchains. Those are real network capabilities; they are not features of the vault. The chain-key idea that matters here is the one under vetKeys and under the subnet your canisters run on: no one node holds the whole secret.
A few smaller pieces, still in the code.
One-time invite links and heir claim links are random tokens generated in the browser. The canister stores a SHA-256 hash of the token, not the token itself. The person you invite receives the token and signs in with their own passkey to accept it. The link is meant to work once, and you should send it privately.
None of this is a claim that the system is unhackable. It is an account of the lock we actually use, and of who is not supposed to hold the key. You can try the full product for fourteen days, with no credit card required. Personal is $48 a year. Household is $72 a year. A plainer explanation of the same lock is in encryption in plain words.
Sources
- ICP, Getting started with Internet Identity and the Internet Identity specification
- W3C, Web Authentication (WebAuthn)
- ICP, VetKeys and Chain-key cryptography
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